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KEEPING POSSESSION OF THE BALL: THE USE




During the last two decades the United States has experienced a dra-
matic proliferation of professional sports teams.1 As a result, many
major cities in the United States host one or more professional sports
franchises.2 Cities without professional sports teams frequently cajole
franchise owners to either relocate their organizations or at least sup-
port the expansion of their league to include additional teams.3 When
two professional sports franchises recently abandoned their host cities,
however, the local governments attempted to prevent their departure.4
1. Currently twenty-one professional hockey franchises exist in the National
Hockey League, twenty-three professional basketball franchises exist in the National
Basketball Association, twenty-eight professional football franchises belong to the Na-
tional Football League, fourteen professional baseball teams belong to the American
League and twelve professional baseball teams exist in the National League. R. WHIT-
TINGHAM, SPORTS PLACES RATED, 16-21 (1986). These figures do not include minor
league professional teams affiliated with parent franchises.
2. The following cities, for example, host multiple professional sports franchises:
Atlanta (football, basketball, baseball); Boston (football, basketball, hockey, baseball);
Buffalo (football, hockey); Chicago (football, basketball, hockey, baseball) (2)); Cleve-
land (football, basketball, baseball); Dallas (football, basketball); Denver (football, bas-
ketball); Detroit (football, basketball, hockey, baseball); Houston (football, baseball);
Kansas City (football, soccer, baseball); Los Angeles (football, basketball (2), hockey,
baseball (2)); Minneapolis/St. Paul (football, hockey, baseball); New York (football (2),
hockey (2), baseball (2), basketball (2)); Philadelphia (football, basketball, hockey base-
ball); Pittsburgh (football, hockey, baseball); St. Louis (football, hockey, baseball); San
Diego (football, baseball); San Francisco (football, basketball, baseball). Id.
3. See O'Neil, And If The Cardinals Leave, What Then?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Jan. 18, 1987, at III, col. 1.
4. In 1980 the Oakland Raiders, a professional football franchise, relocated from
Oakland, California, to Los Angeles, California. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
32 Cal. 3d 60, 63, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3300 (1986). In 1984, the Baltimore Colts, a professional football franchise, relo-
cated from Baltimore, Maryland, to Indianapolis, Indiana. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 279 (D. Md. 1985).
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The ensuing lawsuits5 raised unique issues concerning the use of emi-
nent domain' to prevent the relocation of business enterprises. This
Recent Development examines the legal and related policy issues re-
garding condemnation of a professional sports franchise as a means of
preventing its relocation.
Section I of this Recent Development discusses the legal basis for
exercising the power of eminent domain to block sports franchise relo-
cations. Section II reviews recent litigation involving local government
attempts to prevent the relocation of two professional football teams.
Section III identifies characteristics and frequently overlooked policy
considerations that distinguish the exercise of eminent domain over a
sports franchise from its application to other business entities. Finally,
conclusions are drawn concerning the propriety of using condemnation
to retain sports teams.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
No federal or state constitution provides explicit authority7 for a
state to take private property.8 States, however, derive implicit author-
ity to condemn private property from the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.' Governmental bodies thus remain within
5. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985).
6. Future references to the terms "taking" or "condemnation" in this Recent Devel-
opment imply the exercise of eminent domain. Both terms signify the power of a gov-
ernmental entity to lawfully seize tangible or intangible private property for a "public
use" upon payment of "just compensation," without the owner's consent. See I NICH-
OLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (J. Sackman ed. rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
NICHOLS].
7. Neither the United States Constitution nor any state constitution contains an
express grant of the eminent domain power. This explains why courts have spoken of
an "inherent power" to take private property. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 VASH. L. REV. 553, 560 (1972).
8. Historians speculate that before the evolution of modem eminent domain doc-
trine, the sovereign, whether an individual or a state, held the power to seize all prop-
erty on the basis of ownership. See McClain, Modern Concepts of Police Power and
Eminent Domain, in INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 183, 184 (1969); see also 1
NICHOLS, supra note 6, § 2.12 ("There is one limitation upon the power of eminent
domain which depends upon no express constitutional provision. The powers of a sov-
ereign state, however vast in their character and searching in their extent, are inherently
limited to the subject within the jurisdiction of the state ... ").
9. The fifth amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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their authority only if the taking satisfies the fifth amendment's broadly
interpreted requisites of "public use" and "just compensation."' 0 Be-
cause of the highly varied use of eminent domain, courts reviewing
governmental condemnation extend great deference to legislative deter-
minations regarding these two concepts.'"
The "public use" requisite of eminent domain was originally inter-
preted to require actual public use of the condemned property. The
modern "public benefit" standard1 2 permits a governmental entity to
take private property if the taking will result in some public benefit or
advantage. 13
The "just compensation" requirement under a proper exercise of em-
inent domain generates less controversy than the "public use" require-
ment,' 4 because just compensation is measured under relatively
objective standards. Most governmental bodies and reviewing courts
10. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Midkiff the state
used its power of eminent domain to carry out a legislative mandate to redistribute
ownership of land held by a minority of residents. The court reviewed the plan and held
that "[iludicial deference is required because in our system of government, legislatures
are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the
taking power .... ." Id. at 244.
11. Id.
12. The modern doctrine actually existed prior to 1840. Beginning around 1840,
however, courts began to adopt a narrow view of public use and required actual use by
the public. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L. REv. 615, 626 (1940). By 1900 the courts began to revert to the broader view of
public use, which requires only that a public benefit or advantage occur from the taking
of property. Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders: Defining the Parameters of
Limitless Power, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 397, 404-05. In a recent decision the United
States Supreme Court specifically rejected the narrow view. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Midkiff court stated, "[it is not essential that the
entire community, nor even any considerable portion.... directly enjoy or participate in
any improvement in order to constitute a public use." Id. at 244.
13. See, eg., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (private commercial establish-
ment condemned and given to private developer pursuant to District of Columbia plan
to encourage redevelopment of blighted areas in city); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984) (state condemned large plots of privately owned land and divided
them into smaller units in order to dilute the concentration of ownership). Some state
legislatures have enacted legislation that designates specific takings as satisfying the
public use requirement. See generally Comment, The Public Use Doctrine: Advance
Requiem Revisited, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 688. In the absence of legislation, courts
perform a balancing test and weigh the public benefit against the individual harm. See,
e.g., Nash v. Clark, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
14. The fifth amendment's just compensation requirement applies to state taking
through the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
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rely on the property's fair market value when determining just
compensation.' 5
The unique characteristics inherent in professional sports franchises
distinguish them from traditional business enterprises under eminent
domain analysis, making the application of traditional eminent domain
doctrine inappropriate. 16 Consequently, governmental bodies encoun-
ter unusual policy issues when contemplating condemnation, and re-
viewing courts lack significant precedential authority for guidance.17
15. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 509 (1979); see also 4
NICHOLS, supra note 6, § 12.2[1] ("fair market value [means] the amount of money
which a purchaser willing but not obligated to buy the property would pay to an owner
willing but not obliged to sell it..."); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § VILE at 495-96 (2d ed. 1983).
16. The value of a professional sports team lies in the intangible property interest
conveyed in the franchise agreement. Courts have held that the doctrine of eminent
domain applies to intangible property interests. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984) (trade secrets); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19,
44 (1909) (franchises); Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho
604, 607-08, 619 P.2d 122, 125-26 (1980) (easements), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1983);
Meredith v. Washoe County School Dist., 84 Nev. 15, 435 P.2d 750, 752 (1968) (restric-
tive covenants); see also 1 NICHOLS, supra note 6 § 2.1[2] (like land or other tangible
property, intangible property, such as chose in action, patent rights, franchises, char-
ters, or any other form of contract, are subject to the sovereign's eminent domain pow-
ers); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 73(1966) ("Unless restricted by constitutional
or statutory provisions, the right of eminent domain encompasses property of every
kind and character, whether real or personal, or tangible or intangible. .. ").
Like traditional commercial enterprises, a franchise represents a direct source of tax
revenue. Unlike small traditional businesses, however, the franchise is capable of at-
tracting large numbers of visitors and publicity to the host city. Additionally, a
franchise provides entertainment for the entire community. A winning professional
sports team serves as a catalyst of civic pride and captivates a city as few other commer-
cial or political events. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(1), 131 CONG. REC.
S663, S665 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see also S.172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1), 131
CONG. REC. S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
17. When confronted with a challenge to the exercise of eminent domain over a
professional sports franchise, courts choose one of two options. First, the court can
follow the traditional approach and defer to the legislature's determination of public
use. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions narrowed the scope in which a
court may review such legislative determinations. See, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Federal
courts, in particular, exhibit a reluctance to become entangled in local land use matters.
Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 409, 411-12 (1983). Typically, courts defer to a legislative determination of public
use if the taking appears "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." Midkiff,
467 U.S. at 241. If the court does not defer to the legislative determination, it may
employ a stricter standard. Under the more strict standard, courts can prevent condem-
nation if the legislative determination of public use stands "palpably without reasonable
foundation." Id. (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R., 160 U.S. 668, 680
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II. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO "TAKE" A PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS FRANCHISE
A. The Oakland Raiders
Two municipal attempts to condemn professional football franchises
under the power of eminent domain, and thereby prevent their reloca-
tion, resulted in litigation. The Oakland Raiders, Ltd., a limited part-
nership,"8 owned and managed the Oakland Raiders professional
football team. After the team played in Oakland for nearly two de-
cades,19 the general partnership decided to relocate in Los Angeles.2 °
The City of Oakland sought to prevent the relocation through the con-
demnation of property interests in the franchise.2 1
The Monterey County Superior Court granted summary judgment
for the Oakland Raiders and dismissed the city's action with preju-
dice.2 2 The court's unpublished opinion states that the city's action
lacked the requisite public use.2 3 On appeal, the summary judgment
(1896)). Courts may also prevent condemnation if the legislative determination of pub-
lic use represents an impossibility. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269
U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
18. Allan Davis and Edward W. McGah served as the general partners of the Oak-
land Raiders professional football franchise. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd.,
32 Cal. 3d 60, 63, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1986).
19. In 1966 the Oakland Raiders, Ltd., executed an agreement with the National
Football League to operate a professional football franchise in Oakland, California.
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 425-26, 176 Cal. Rptr.
646, 647 (1981). Oakland Raiders, Ltd., then entered into a license agreement with the
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc., a nonprofit California corporation, for one
five-year term and five three-year renewal options. The Oakland Raiders played in the
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum during the initial five-year term and renewed their
lease for the optional three-year terms in 1970, 1973, and 1976. The partnership failed
to reach an agreement, however, concerning the three-year term commencing with the
1980 season. Id.
20. The decision of the Los Angeles Rams professional football team to vacate the
Los Angeles Coliseum made the relocation of the Oakland Raiders franchise possible.
California Supreme Court Survey, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 167, 238 n.16 (1982-83). A
relocation to southern California offered the Oakland Raiders an opportunity for in-
creased revenues from television contracts for the broadcast of home games. 307 Sports
News, Variety, July 14, 1982, at 42. The Los Angeles Coliseum offered the Oakland
Raiders inducements potentially worth $25 million. The inducements included the ex-
pansion of stadium luxury suites, which represented a significant source of revenue.
Kohn, Luring a Franchise, The Big Score, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1987, at 3,
col. 1.
21. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
22. Id.
23. The court stated that "no 'public use' essential to an eminent domain action
1987]
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was affirmed. 24 The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, re-
versed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the superior
court,25 instructing the court to fully adjudicate the public use issue.26
On remand, the superior court again found for the Oakland Raiders.27
The California Court of Appeal reversed the decision and remanded
the case.28 The superior court found for the Oakland Raiders on this
remand and dismissed the city's action on the basis of impossibility.29
The court reasoned that the National Football League Constitution
and Bylaws30 precluded the city from owning the franchise.31 The
could be found, and [that the city] lacked the authority to exercise eminent domain for
the purpose of retaining the Raiders' franchise in Oakland." Id. (quoting Monterey
County Superior Court's unpublished opinion).
24. The court held that it lacked statutory authorization to permit the "condemna-
tion of the diverse contract rights necessary to operation of the Raiders' business enter-
prise." City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 430, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 646, 650 (1981).
25. The California Supreme Court held that a material issue of fact concerning the
public use issue precluded the lower courts' granting of summary judgment. 32 Cal. 3d
60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
26. Id. The California Supreme Court applied a broad interpretation of condemna-
ble property that included both tangible and intangible property. The court also
adopted a broad view of public use. The court reasoned that the expansive role and
scope of government required greater flexibility in defining public use. In cautious lan-
guage, the court stated that the city's "operation of a sports franchise may be an appro-
priate municipal function." Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
27. City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1983). The court articulated five reasons in finding for the partnership.
First, the court found that the intangible property was not located in the city of Oak-
land, citing the non-Oakland residences of the organization's general partners, players,
and staff. The court also explained that the franchise area included an area exceeding
the city limits of Oakland and concluded that the "economic and recreational influence"
of the team was not restricted to the city. Second, the court found it reasonably prob-
able that the city would not meet the statutory proscription of converting the con-
demned property to public use in seven years. The court reasoned that the probable
litigation following a taking would consume the statutory time period. Third, the court
held that the franchise was not subject to acquisition by the power of eminent domain
for the stated purpose. Fourth, the court found that the city had violated procedural
proscriptions prior to commencement of the eminent domain action. Finally, the court
concluded that the proposed taking did not advance a public interest or necessity. Id. at
273-79, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 732-36.
28. Id. at 267, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The California Court of Appeal summarily
dismissed all five points raised by the Superior Court of Monterey. Id.
29. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., No. 76044 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey
County Aug. 10, 1984).
30. "No corporation, association, partnership or other entity not operated for profit
nor any charitable organization or entity not presently a member of the League shall be
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court of appeal affirmed the superior court's decision. 2 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.33
B. The Baltimore Colts
In 1984 the owner of the Baltimore Colts professional football
franchise considered relocating his team after negotiations to secure a
stadium lease agreement faltered. 34 Fearing a departure similar to that
witnessed in Oakland, the Maryland legislature enacted an emergency
measure authorizing the City of Baltimore to acquire professional
sports franchises through eminent domain.35 Before the city could en-
join the team from moving,36 however, the franchise removed virtually
all of its tangible property37 from the state.38 The city subsequently
eligible for membership." NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BY-
LAWS § 3.2(a) (1984).
31. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., No. 76044 (Cal. Super. Ct. Monterey
County filed July 16, 1984) (Tentative Decision at 7-8, adopted in court's Statement of
Decision filed August 10, 1984). The court also based its holding on a violation of
California statutory requirements concerning eminent domain procedures, a violation of
California's eminent domain law as it applies to transfers of taken property, and a viola-
tion of due process guarantees. Finally, the court held that the city's attempt to exercise
eminent domain over the Oakland Raiders violated the commerce clause. Id.
32. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1985).
33. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673, cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986).
34. Negotiations with Colts' owner Robert Irsay for renewal of the stadium lease
included extensive interactions between Irsay, Mayor William Schaefer of Baltimore,
and Governor Harry Hughes of Maryland. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 279.
35. Id. Emergency Bill No. 1042 became effective with the governor's signature on
March 29, 1984. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d
954, 955 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). On March 30, the City
Council of Baltimore enacted Emergency Ordinance No. 32, which permitted condem-
nation of the Baltimore Colts. That day, the city filed a condemnation petition in Mary-
land state court. The state court granted an injunction to prohibit the franchise from
relocating outside of Maryland. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Baltimore
Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. at 280-81.
36. Irsay ordered the removal of the team's possessions on March 27. During the
night of March 28-29, professional movers removed the possessions from the state. On
March 29, 1984, Irsay notified the Commissioner of the National Football League that
the franchise had relocated to Indianapolis as of the close of business the previous day.
Id. at 280.
37. The March 28-29 move included the removal of office and athletic equipment
from the training complex. After March 29, the only tangible property remaining in
Maryland was the training complex. Id.
19871
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won an injunction prohibiting the team's relocation and filed suit to
enforce the injunction.3 9 In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Baltimore Football Club, Inc.,4° a United States District Court held
that at the time the City of Baltimore ordered condemnation and ob-
tained the injunction it lacked jurisdiction over the franchise.4 ' The
court reasoned that moving the team's tangible property from the state
also removed the intangible property interests in the franchise.42
38. The franchise relocated to Indianapolis, Indiana, and agreed to play in a sta-
dium constructed in anticipation of luring a sports franchise. The City of Indianapolis
offered to rent the stadium facilities for only $25,000 per game and guaranteed Irsay a
minimum of $7 million revenue from ticket sales, preseason television rights, and radio
rights. Additionally, the city agreed to pay any interest accruing in excess of 8% per
annum on a 10-year, $12.5 million loan with a local bank. Kohn, Indianapolis Enjoys
Renaissance, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1987, at 12, col. I.
39. Id. After learning of the City of Bailtimore's actions in filing a condemnation
suit in Maryland state court, the Baltimore Colts organization removed the suit to fed-
eral court. The organization then filed an action in federal court in Indiana seeking
injunctive relief to enjoin the condemnation proceedings in Maryland. 741 F.2d 954,
956 (7th Cir. 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subse-
quently dismissed the case. Id. at 958.
40. 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985).
41. Id.
42. Id. Commentators acknowledge that the power of eminent domain extends no
further than the jurisdiction of the state. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 6, § 2.12. Recognizing
this, however, merely begs the question of how to establish the intangible entity's loca-
tion. The Maryland federal district court linked the movement of the team's tangible
property with the removal of the intangible franchise interest from the state. The court
stated that if the "tangibles necessary and valuable to the operation of the team" had
not been removed by March 30, the result might have been different. 624 F. Supp. at
285. Additionally, the court rejected the theory that the training facility which re-
mained in the state constituted sufficient minimum contacts to permit jurisdiction over
the team. Id. at 284.
The court rested its decision on constitutional and statutory proscriptions requiring
compensation before condemnation could occur. Maryland statutes require the pay-
ment of compensation before a governmental entity has a right to possession. 624 F.Supp. at 283. The statutes permit a quick-take procedure through which the govern-
mental entity takes possession of the condemned property after making a payment to
the court equal to the property's estimated value. The issues of public use and fair
compensation are determined at a subsequent trial. MARYLAND REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 12-101 (1982). In this case, the City of Baltimore had not paid compensation
for the football franchise and had not exercised a quick-take procedure, so it had no
right to possession when the Colts moved their property. 624 F. Supp. at 283.
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III. POLICY ISSUES RAISED IN THE CONDEMNATION
OF A SPORTS FRANCHISE
A. Irreplaceable Property
The act of taking a professional sports franchise through eminent
domain deprives its owner of potentially irreplaceable property. Un-
like the condemnation of traditional commercial enterprises, the taking
of a sports franchise claims intangible property interests unique to that
business. For example, a restaurant franchisee can still operate the
franchise even if a city condemns the structure in which that business
operates. Although the taking deprives the business of a potentially
prime location, the owier retains his or her interest in the franchise
and may reopen elsewhere. When a city condemns a sports franchise,
however, the owner loses the essential franchise interest.
A sports franchise further represents a virtually irreplaceable com-
modity due to artificial entry restraints on the market. All professional
sports leagues maintain tight control over the number and geographi-
cal distribution of their member-franchises.43 Although such control
does not wholly prevent an individual from purchasing another
franchise, these restrictions distort the market in terms of both price
and availability.
B. Sufficiency of Compensation
Compensation for condemned sports franchises also raises issues not
evident when eminent domain is applied to other business enterprises.
Fair market value is the traditional measure of just compensation in
condemnation actions.' This traditional standard, however, presumes
43. The National Football League controls the establishment of new franchises, the
ability of franchises to relocate, and which franchises shall have the right to employ
individual athletes. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381,
1402 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). Historically, the NFL permitted
franchises to exist only in specified terroritories likely to ensure financial success. Id. at
1394. When the NFL absorbed the teams affiliated with the American Football League,
it provided hardship payments totaling $18 million to original NFL teams located in
cities also hosting a newly enfranchised American Football League team. Id. at 1393.
The NFL's control over the number of franchises ensures the maintenance of profits
derived from the gross proceeds. These profits are split among the league's member-
ship. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(2), (3), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S667-68 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985). For example, the NFL's last five-year contract with the three na-
tional television networks generated $2.1 billion in revenue. During the contract period
1981-86, each franchise's share of revenue averaged $13.5 million per year. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Mar. 15, 1987, at I 1G, col. 1.
44. Courts permit the use of methodologies other than fair market valuation when
1987]
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an active market. As noted earlier, artificial restrictions on the number
of existing professional sport franchises deter frequent changes of own-
ership and prevent the establishment of a meaningful market price. Al-
ternatively, use of the. team's book value as a basis for determining
"just compensation" may not constitute sufficient proceeds for the
owner to purchase another franchise, if one is even available.45
C. Relationships with the Parent League
All professional sports franchises require the organization, direction,
and legitimacy that a parent league affords them. Following a member
franchise's condemnation, its form of ownership may represent an im-
portant issue to the league. For example, the National Football League
Constitution and Bylaws restrict ownership of teams to "only a profit-
making person or an entity organized for the purpose of operating a
professional football club. .. ,46 Consequently, governmental bodies
lack practical alternatives if the league revokes the franchise of a team
condemned through eminent domain. Without a league and other
teams committed to playing, a professional sports team has no forum
in which it can operate.
Although recent court decisions did find certain league rules viola-
tive of antitrust law,47 expending public funds to challenge a private
fair market value proves difficult to calculate or results in an injustice on the property
owner. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
45. Professional sports franchises differ in value. Teams in major metropolitan ar-
eas such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Philadelphia, and San
Francisco receive higher appraisal values than franchises located in other communities.
Franigan, Some Lessons for Business In Baseball, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1986,
at IG, col. 1. Additionally, some franchises' current valuations represent enormous
increases in recent years. For example, the valuation of the New York Mets baseball
teams increased from $21 million in 1980 to $80 million in 1986, id., representing a
250% increase in six years. Even if an owner receives fair compensation for the con-
demned franchise, the ability to purchase another team may prove impossible without
additional capital.
46. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 3.2 (1984).
47. Baseball is the only professional sport exempt from federal antitrust laws.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). State antitrust laws do not apply to profes-
sional sports teams because of the teams' interstate activities. See id. In 1984 a federal
court held that the NFL's Rule 4.3 prohibiting the relocation of a franchise without
league approval constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade. Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984). On appeal of the decision for the second part of the bifurcated proceeding, the
court of appeals held that the lower court's finding of antitrust liability applied only to
the application of Rule 4.3 to the specific circumstances of that case. Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986).
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organization's constitution and bylaws may lack political appeal to
community decisionmakers. Even if the league constitution and by-
laws do not preclude governmental ownership of a member franchise,
the relationship presents other problems. For example, if a league de-
cides to assess each franchise a fee to facilitate the purchase of private
property for nonpublic use, constitutional limitations may prevent lo-
cal government payment of such an assessment. Similarly, a govern-
ment-owned franchise may be unable to effectively disassociate itself
with a league's political or philosophical views that advocate positions
contrary to public policy.
D. Contractual Relationships
The many contractual obligations inherent in the operation of a pro-
fessional sports franchise further complicate the application of eminent
domain to such entities. Many state statutes provide that employment
contracts requiring a particular employer's supervision prevent the del-
egation of that obligation to one other than the employer.4 The taking
of a franchise and the resultant delegation of supervisory responsibili-
ties arguably discharges the player-employee from his contract.49 An
additional legal issue concerns the employment status of each player
and coach after condemnation. If a player's employment status resem-
bles that of a municipal employee and he injures another participant in
the course of an athletic event, the player, coach, and municipality may
be held liable.5 ° Finally, a government-owned sports team is certain to
encounter resistance when defending the expenditure of public funds to
maintain a competitive salary structure.51
48. See 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865, at 438-39 (1951).
49. Id.
50. One potential basis for suit lies in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). This provision pro-
vides a civil court remedy for the deprivation of rights protected under law.
51. The minimum salary for a first year player in major league baseball for 1987 was
$62,500. What They Make, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 20, 1987, at 55. The Los An-
geles Dodgers professional baseball team's 1987 average player salary was $580,250. Id.
at 81. The Seattle Mariners professional baseball team reported the lowest average
player salary in 1987 at $186,146. Id. Pete Rose, manager of the Cincinnati Reds pro-
fessional baseball team, earned $750,000 in 1987. Id. In addition to base salaries, many
player contracts include incentive clauses. Id. Reggie Jackson of the Oakland Athletics
professional baseball team received 15-30 cents per person in attendance at home games
when the franchise attracted between 1.6-1.8 million fans for the season. Id.
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E. Interstate Commerce
In the absence of specific federal legislation, states may regulate ac-
tivities affecting interstate commerce. 2 In the seminal case of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.53 the United States Supreme Court established a
balancing test to determine the validity of such state actions. 54 The
test requires that the state's interest in regulating a specific activity out-
weigh the burden imposed on interstate commerce. 55  Analyzing the
condemnation of a sports franchise under the Pike test exposes signifi-
cant intrusions on interstate commerce and marginal benefits to the
governmental entity.
The condemnation of a professional sports franchise constitutes a
forced sale and prevents purchase of the team through competitive in-
terstate bidding. 6 Due to the artificial limitation on the number of
franchises, potential buyers greatly exceed existing sellers. The con-
demnation of a franchise effectively circumvents the interstate bidding
process and denies the franchise owner free market access.5
Further undermining any validity of sports franchise condemnation
under the Pike test is the fact that the benefits of government owner-
ship are speculative. First, although the increase in civic pride58 and
52. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution specifically reserves to
Congress the power "tlo regulate commerce... among the several States .. " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is
a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regu-
late it." Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
53. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
54. Id. at 142.
55. "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on intertate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposd on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the puta-
tive local benefits ... " Id.
56. Nothing precludes a governmental entity from entering the market as a partici-
pant. Therefore, if a city wanted to bid on the purchase of a professional sports
franchise, the commerce clause would not restrict the activity. White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
57. Some commentators perceive the condemnation of a sports franchise as ob-
structing the interstate movement of entertainment. See Note, The Constitutionality of
Taking a Sports Franchise by Eminent Domain and the Need for Federal Legislation to
Restrict Franchise Relocation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 582 (1985). The argument
made by one commentator states that the condemnation of a franchise ensures "that
production of the entertainment occur[s] only in its locale on those occasions when the
team is designateo as the home team." Id.
58. S. 287, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101(a)(1), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily ed.
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community prestige resulting from the presence of a successful sports
franchise generally raises the quality of life and attracts visitors and
businesses, such gains cannot be quantitatively measured.5 9 Second,
even the measurable benefits of condemnation cannot survive Pike test
scrutiny. For example, if a sports team attracts outside capital to the
local economy60 and increases entertainment tax revenue,6 the con-
demnation of the franchise will not necessarily ensure the continuation
of those economic benefits. If the team becomes a perennial loser or
develops a bad reputation and attendance declines, the government-
owner risks declining tax revenue with constant or escalating costs.
62
Similarly, if the local economy falters and attendance declines due to
the shrinkage of personal discretionary funds, tax revenues will decline
while costs remain constant or increase. Thus, the actual extent of the
local economic benefit and generation of tax revenue from a sports
franchise remains tenuous because of unique and unpredictable
variables.63
Jan. 24, 1985); see also S. 172, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(a)(1), 131 CONG. REc. S282,
S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (professional football teams serve to instill pride in fans).
59. Similarly, the entertainment valu6 of a sports franchise to a city, although im-
portant, defies quantification. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(9), 131 CONG.
REc. S663, S665 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see also S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3),
131 CONG. REC. S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (professional football teams provide
an important source of entertainment).
60. Contra Lancaster, Stadium Projects Are Proliferating Amid Debate Over Benefit
To Cities, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1987, at 33, col. 4. One study indicates that the eco-
nomic benefits attributed to professional sports teams actually represent a reallocation
of discretionary funds from other sources of expenditures such as family entertainment.
The sports franchise does not, therefore, enlarge the pie, but merely affects its division.
Id.
61. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(9), 131 CONG. REC. 5663, S665 (daily
ed. Jan. 24, 1985); see also S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3), 131 CONG. REc. S282,
S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (cities hosting professional football teams derive "substan-
tial tax revenues and employment opportunities" from the events). Contra Lancaster,
supra note 60, at 33, col. 4. Recent research suggests that employment created by the
presence of a professional sports franchise has negligible impact on the local economy
because the jobs consist of low-pay, service-oriented activities. Id.
62. Many cities construct sports stadiums with public funds and then lease the facil-
ities to professional sports franchises at a rate that does not fully cover construction
costs. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(4), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S665 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985).
63. The local economic benefits and generation of tax revenue may also be held
hostage by the franchise itself. Professional sports franchises have gained leverage in
lease negotiations by threatening to relocate. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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A final factor that the Pike Court suggested be included in the bal-
ancing process concerns a fundamental question of public function.
Neither the Oakland nor the Baltimore case reached the issue of public
use. 64 The modem preference for broadly defining public use permits
governmental entities to assume nontraditional roles in the delivery of
specific goods and services. An important public function, however, is
typically present in most of these accepted nontraditional roles. The
involvement of a governmental entity in the management and opera-
tion of a professional sports franchise, however, lacks the attributes of
an essential public function. Additionally, a less restrictive means of
retaining a franchise often exists. In both Oakland and Baltimore, the
franchise's relocation followed the failure of reaching agreement on an
athletic stadium's lease. If a governmental entity perceives significant
benefits in retaining a professional sports franchise, some combination
of monetary concessions, incentives, or direct grants provides a less
costly and risky alternative.65
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of eminent domain allows cities to efficiently grow in a
controlled and deliberate fashion. The use of the doctrine to prevent
the departure of a professional sports franchise is a recent phenome-
non. Although such franchises make significant contributions to the
host community, their ultimate societal importance does not justify
condemnation under the doctrine of eminent domain. The severe im-
pact of such a taking on affected individuals and groups together with
the tenuous preservation of public benefits outweighs the perceived
gains.
Thomas J. Campbell
64. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., No. 76044 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mon-
terey County Aug. 10, 1984) (Judgment at 1-2); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v. Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1985).
65. Many of the issues raised in this Recent Development also apply to situations in
which a city aids a private party in the purchase of the franchise. Although the com-
merce clause problem evaporates, the policy issues still exist. Similarly, if a governmen-
tal entity purchases a franchise, the policy and political issues associated with a
condemnation action still apply. The author believes that every city contemplating any
degree of involvement with a professional sports franchise should perform its own bal-
ancing test to assess the prudence of such an undertaking.
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